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The Upside Down Pyramid:
Declining Populations Mean a
Demographic Crisis for Europe
by Lauren Soelberg

Introduction
The declining birthrate in Europe has become a major concern for politicians and
citizens alike. When President Kennedy gave his "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech in 1963,
Europe accounted for 12.5 percent of the world's population. Now that number has
dropped to 7.2 percent, and by 2050 it is predicted to drop to only 5 percent. A major
source of the problem is found in southern Europe. The fertility rate of women in Italy
is 1.2, among the lowest in the world (Krause 2005,1). The declining population has
had negative ramifications on many aspects of European life, such as employment,
social benefits, and a continually shrinking workforce. In order to find a solution, it
is critical to examine the causes of the population decline and to identify the effect
policies have had on fixing it.

Literature Review
Many scholars and politicians, including Ann Crittenden, attribute the demographic crisis to an increase of women in the workforce. This claim has caused controversy in the subsequent policy-making of both the EU and individual member
states. However, Elizabeth Krause and Russell Shorto disagree with Crittenden,
attributing the crisis more to cultural and social changes. In comparing Italy and
Sweden, policy changes in favor of mothers have had a marginal impact on birthrates in Scandinavian society, but incentivized policies in Italy have not had the
same effect. The same comparisons may be drawn between Europe and the United
States. Clearly, it will take much more than policy implementation to shift the population decline in Europe. However, policy implementation is intrinsically linked
to many parts of society; thus, drastic shifts must occur in nearly every aspect of
European culture and society.
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Krause claims the main problem stems from the fact that women fear they cannot
reach society's expectations, so they opt not to have children. In Italy, she claims there is
a culture of responsibility, making women feel they must live up to a certain stereotype
of the perfect mother, but women fear they cannot or will not reach those expectations.
Similarly, she admits high expectations may prevent women from having more than
one child, not because they are afraid, but because they are resisting the mold society
has formed. Krause argues there is another element that could be at play here, one based
more on perceptions and appearances. Younger women find it unfashionable to fit into
the stereotypical mother figure, which is a complete cultural shift among the younger
population of Italy and in Europe as a whole. She relates an example of a group of
childless women out to lunch in Italy, who raise their glasses to a toast, exclaiming, lito
us ultra-cool women because we don't think about cleaning" (Krause 175). However,
she also acknowledges the cause for the crisis could simply be that for women, the costs
of having children outweigh the benefits both economically and rationally. Women are
choosing to gain an education and enter the workforce in much greater numbers, which
means they are having children later and consequently less total children.
Shorto fundamentally rejects the idea women in the workforce have a large impact
on birthrate. He argues that in lithe Netherlands, there are a greater number of women
in the workforce, but at the same time the birthrate in the Netherlands is significantly
higher than in Italy, (1.73 compared to 1.33)" (Shorto 2008). According to Shorto, social
conservatives tie the low birthrate to secularism. The attachment to God in Europe
has been waning for years, and the acceptance and rise of birth control teamed with
decreasing religious attendance has exacerbated the problem. Yet, he also admits there
could be other factors at work here, the largest being economic (Shorto 2008).
Aside from religious concerns, the economy is a major problem facing Europe,
and, in addition, to declining birth rates, the population is growing older and living
longer than ever. The expected lifespan has risen dramatically all over Europe in
recent years, contributing to the stress on the economy and society as a whole. The
problem is especially daunting for youth who will have to cope with supporting a
continually aging population without the hope of someone doing the same for them
in the future. Shorto also claims low wages for starting employment in Italy have
caused young people to delay leaving their parents' homes and security nets in favor
of entering the workforce later. This relates to the fact that parents are having children
at a much later age. If young people delay moving out, they also delay getting married
and starting their own families. A late start in child bearing usually limits parents to
one or two children. (Shorto 2008).
Shorto contrasts several places to further illustrate his point. He claims there
are two models to achieving higher fertility. The neo-socialist Scandinavian model
promotes generous social benefits, whereas the laissez-faire American model is more
flexible with demands. Italy adheres to neither model and has had a much greater
struggle. Krause uses another comparative approach to digest the demographic
information available. He compares women in the labor force over time to determine
if the number of women who work affects fertility. Like Shorto, Krause believes the
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impact is minimal, and the problem is more indicative of a set of cultural and societal
norms that have changed over time.
Many Italians are quick to place the blame upon young people and women,
but Krause maintains young people and women are not the problem. Meanwhile,
Shorto addresses the commonly held assumption that population is correlated
with economic growth. He contends this correlation is incorrect and refutes the
endogenous theory of growth. The accepted wisdom on the demographic problem
is that as women enter the job market, the fertility rate drops. Shorto, however,
stresses that in reality the opposite has been the case. Hans-Peter Kohler from the
University of Pennsylvania proved that "high fertility was correlated with high
female labor-force participation" (Shorto).
From a completely opposing perspective, Crittenden feels birth rates are indeed
connected to women. She claims motherhood is the single greatest obstacle left in
the path to economic equality for women. All women who leave the workforce with
a college education to become mothers are faced with a "mommy tax," which is
estimated to be greater than $1 million. The mommy tax is an estimation of earnings
a woman would have made if she did not have children. This tax discourages many
women from having children at all. Crittenden argues that in the U.S. many women
are unaware of the high opportunity costs of being a mother. Therefore, they are
less aware of the choices between a career or a family. This limits American women
in comparison to their European counterparts. Crittenden illustrates this point
further by stating that Swedish women have higher benefits, such as a year's paid
maternity leave, the right to work shorter days and still receive full benefits, and
a government stipend to cover costs associated with childcare. Crittenden claims
these benefits "enable a higher percentage of Swedish women, vis a vis Americans,
to have children" (Crittenden 2002,108). She contrasts this with the case of Germany,
where before the fall of the Berlin wall, mothers received similar benefits to the
Swedish system. Almost every woman had a baby and worked. Since the German
reunification, however, "subsidized jobs and subsidized childcare were eliminated in
East Germany. As a result, birth rates plummeted. Berlin now has one of the lowest
birthrates in the world" (Crittenden 109). Crittenden attributes the population decline
to a lack of rights for women who leave the workforce. However, it has been proven
that the population is actually higher in areas where women are more integrated in
the workforce (Shorto 2008). Additionally, she claims France and Sweden have more
effective policies regarding women who decide to become mothers, so they should
have increasing birthrates. The fact is these countries still rank among the top nations
in terms of population decline.
Although Crittenden has excellent arguments for policy amendments to recognize
the importance of motherhood and improve the welfare of mothers, it does not seem
that policy is the most significant cause for the population decline. Rather, Shorto and
Krause attribute the decline to cultural and social causes. The claim that women's policy
affects birthrates is highly controversial; Europeans are more prone to believe current
trends in European society such as secularism affect birthrates. Crittenden is correct
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in assuming policy can affect birthrates but only in countries where a demographic
crisis already exists. The causal mechanisms are backwards in her argument. While she
claims policy favoring mothers leads to higher birthrates, it is more plausible that low
birthrates lead to policy changes, and the occasional upward slopes in population are
merely a sign of natural population swings.
It is also important to explore immigration, which greatly affects the demographic
crisis. There are claims that a larger influx of non-European immigrants may lead
to increased xenophobia (Shorto 2008) and a desire to increase the number of white
Europeans. Immigration raises concerns for native Europeans, because immigrant
populations are not affected by the population decline of their European host country
and continue to have more children than European counterparts. If this argument is
true, then immigration laws should increase and attitudes toward immigrants shift in
a negative direction as immigration increases. It would also lend more credibility to
the secularist argument, because Muslim immigrants are much more religious than
Europeans and have much higher birthrates. Shorto and Krause claim that if Europeans
were more religious, birthrates in Europe would not be dropping so rapidly.
One theme in demographic theory is that as society changes, human fertility
levels remain high because of the continuing influence of outdated props that
maintain existing birthrates. Caldwell argues that social upheavals might change
these props, leading to a fall in fertility. He examines thirteen social crises ranging
from the seventeenth-century English Civil War to the fall of communism in Eastern
Europe in the late-twentieth century. All cases show marked falls in fertility "arising
from deferred female marriage, declining marital fertility, or both" (Caldwell 2004,
382). The evidence is that this change did not originate from existing social conditions
but from temporary adjustments to a new period of uncertainty resulting from new
socioeconomic and legislative conditions. Thus, changes in policy regarding families
or mothers could work similarly to change conditions and affect fertility rates.

Significance
Since demographiCS affect immigration policy and xenophobia, the declining
population trends in Europe have been labeled a demographic crisis. The demographic crisis has created an upside down pyramid economy in Europe, where a
small proportion of people at the bottom must support a large group of people at
the top. These conditions are unsustainable, and Europe will face serious economic
catastrophes if the popUlation trend continues so rapidly. Increased incentives and
policy implementation in favor of mothers may help stimulate the growth rate initially, but the effects of policy will be unable to solve entirely the demographic crisis
in Europe. Change is necessary on a much broader scale. The scope of this problem
reaches into nearly every area of European society: culture, religion, economic issues, immigration, and EU integration. Women's rights are certainly an influential
component, but simply imposing change at the policy level will not inspire visible
results. It is possible the demographic crisis in Europe may never improve, and
Europe's population will shrink to 5 percent of the world's total popUlation by 2050
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and then to 2.5 percent fifty years after that. Perhaps it is simply the natural flow of
demographics in the world that the minorities, immigrants, and impoverished citizens will become the majority, with Caucasians and others from developed countries an extreme minority. Current trends suggest such a future.

Hypothesis
I hypothesize that greater amounts of government expenditures allocated to
social benefits, specifically for families, will increase the fertility rate in a country over
time. If social policies for families are effective, they should increase the quality of life
for mothers and children. Therefore, these politics will increase the total fertility rate.
Since Europe has the lowest fertility rates in the world and faces a demographic crisis,
I will only use European countries in this study. If family contributions are shown
to have a statistically significant impact on fertility rates, I will conclude the policies
targeting families are effective.

Methodology
I examined the relationship between family contributions and fertility rates by
using regression analysis. I began by compiling a Simple regression to determine the
relationship between family contributions and fertility rates (see Figure 1). Figure 1
is a scatter plot of the relationship between the family contributions in each country
and the fertility rate in each country. The relationship has poor fit as shown by the
wide variance in the data and signals heteroskedasticity. However, the relationship
is positive, which helps confirm my hypothesis that greater family contributions
increase the fertility rate.
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Figure 1: Family Contributions and Fertility Rates
I chose to use panel data in this analysis and controlled for both time and state
fixed effects, which operate under the assumption the variable will change either over
time and state or both. The regression shows the coefficient for each of the thirty
countries for 1997, 2000, 2005, and 2007. These coefficients are what affect the fertility
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rate. When including these effects, we can be sure that our results accurately show
the relationships across both time and states. The state fixed effects control for factors
such as state culture (i.e., political affiliation, alcohol consumption, urban percentage,
etc). Time fixed affects account for changes over longer periods of time, like the
implementation of policy.
I have included one independent variable and four control variables. These
control variables isolate the effects of family contributions on fertility rates and control
for any possible omitted variable biases. I have used the fertility rate in European
countries for 1997, 2000, 2005, and 2007 to assess the effect of government expenditure
on family over time. I am interested in the effect of family contributions on fertility
rates, which is measured annually in the World Development Indicators database as
well as the Eurostat database. I have used the social benefits toward family data from
Eurostat as my main independent variable to assess how much of social benefit funds
are allocated toward the family. From this I will have determined its effect on fertility
rates. In order to isolate the effects of family contributions, I have controlled for other
variables that could be affecting the fertility rate. According to researchers who have
studied the demographic crisis, there are many factors that contribute to the increase
or decrease of birth rates. First, the refugee population may be having more kids than
domestic citizens. Second, is the population growth. If the population is growing due
to other reasons, such as immigration and emigration, birthrate will likely be affected.
Third, other indicators such as life expectancy and income inequality will certainly
affect birthrate, which I have included as control variables in the regression.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Independent
Variable
Family Contributions
Control Variables
Refugee Population
Population Growth
Life Expectancy
Income Inequality

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

113

9.375

3.25

2.3

16.9
1,049,000

118

58,043

155,762

4

120
120

.345
76.8

.698

-1.82

2.44

3.31

69

81.72

97

4.56

1.153

2.9

7.8

I hypothesize there is endogeneity between family contributions and the total
number of births per woman. I believe endogeneity exists because of omitted variables and reverse causality. It is impossible to control for all variables that affect fertility rate. In order to reduce the endogeneity due to omitted variable bias, I used fixed
effects. This data allowed me to remove the differences due to variables unique to
each country and the variables unique to 1997,2000,2005, and 2007. For example,
a country's implementation of individual policies regarding women, families, and
children would be more likely to increase the fertility rate; however, applying entity
fixed effects for each country reduces this potential bias. The rate at which new policies are implemented is another variable that may affect fertility rate, because often it
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takes significant time for legislation to be enforced from the time it is passed to actual
implementation. The error from omitted variable bias is reduced through using both
entity fixed effects and time fixed effects.
Table 2: The Effect of Public Expenditure for Families on Fertility Rates:
Regression results
Dependent variable: Fertility rate (total births per woman)
Coefficient on
Family
Contributions
Country
characteristic
control variables a ?

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

.0323**
(.0063)

.0305**
(.0080)

.0034
(.0121)

.0314**
(.0083)

.0035
(.0121)

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

-8.51
(1.18)
.0743
(.0604)
.0314**
(.0112)
-.0142
(.0177)

-1.10
(1.06)
.1202*
(.0475)
.0077
(.0128)
.0014
(.0183)

-1.01
(2.22)
.0702
(.0550)
.0331*
(.0128)
.0116
(.0218)

.4884
(1.29)
.1075*
(.0470)
-.0167
(.0273)
.0004
(.0189)

yes

no

yes

no

yes

-

Population
Growth (annual)
Life Expectancy

-

Income Inequality

-

Country fixed
effects?
Year fixed effects?
F-statistic testing
the hypothesis
that the state fixed
effects are zero
F-statistic testing
the hypothesis
that the year fixed
effects are zero

no

no

no

no

-

-

-

-

-

14.263
(.0000)

-

.8875

-

yes
15.016
(.0000)

.381
(.767)

15.016
(.0000)

.4112

.8932

lP

.1558

.4233

R2

.1634

.4537

.9266

.4608

.9336

SER
n

.2393

.1934

.0854

.1954

.0832

113

96

96

96

96

Notes: All regressions include an intercept. For regressions (1)-(4), heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors appear in parentheses below estimated coefficients; for regression (5), the standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the state level, so as to allow for serial correlation in the error
within a state. p-values appear in parentheses beneath heteroskedasticity-robust F-statistics (or, for
regression (5), heteroskedasticity-robust-clustered F-statistic). Coefficients are significant at the **alpha<.Ol
and *alpha<.05Ievels.

Results
According to the regression results (shown in Table 2), the family contributions
variable does have a statistically significant effect on fertility rate. The first regression
shows the family contributions coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level because the p-value (.000) is lower than .01. The R-squared value, however,
is only .163, indicating that family contributions only explain 16.3 percent of the
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variance in fertility rates. In the following regressions, the coefficient for family
contributions is significant at the 5 percent level when not controlling for state fixed
effects and also significant when controlling for other variables. In regression (2), life
expectancy is also statistically significant. The p-value is .006, indicating significance
at the 1 percent level because the p-value is smaller than .01. The other coefficients are
not statistically significant indicators of fertility rate.
Regression (3) shows the family contributions variable is no longer statistically
significant when also controlling for state fixed effects. The R-squared value of this
regression, however, is very high while none of the coefficients are individually
statistically significant. This shows us that state fixed effects are a significant
indicator of fertility rates but that only population growth is significant when
state fixed effects are included. Regression (4) controls for time fixed effects, and
the results are very different from regression (3). It appears family contributions
are significant over time when controlling for important factors. In regression (4),
however, the R-squared value again drops to .46, signaling that time fixed effects
with these variables only predicts 46 percent of the variance in fertility rates. In
regression (5), the most comprehensive, I have controlled for time and state fixed
effects and have included all control variables. When controlling for both time
and state fixed effects in the last regression, I found that the R-squared value is
highest. These two fixed effects variables do explain most of the variance in fertility
rate, though only the population growth variable is statistically significant. The
F-statistics for regressions (3), (4), and (5) show us that the time fixed effects are
insignificant unless also tested with state fixed effects. In both regression (3) and
regression (5), the F-statistic is higher than 10 with a p-value of .0000, proving
significance at the 1 percent level.

Limitations
There is a high probability the independent variable family contributions is
highly correlated with an outside instrumental variable that it is affecting the family
contributions of each country. There may also be an issue with simultaneous causality,
where one or more of these variables may be influenced by the fertility rate rather than
the other way around. Unfortunately, I was unable to find a measurable and consistent
enough instrument to control for simultaneous causality, so there may be some bias
in my information. However, this bias should tend toward an underestimation on the
family contribution coefficient, so any substantive significance found for the fertility
rate would likely be correct.
There are several external validity violations present with this research and
analysis. With regard to external validity, there is an endogeneity issue with reverse
causality. A positive correlation was found for the relationship between fertility rate
and family contributions, but it could be true that fertility rates are affecting the
amount of social benefits allocated to family contributions. This problem could be
fixed with an instrumental variable; however, I was unable to find a good instrument
for this analysis. Another endogeneity problem in this analysis is omitted variable
149

SIGMA

bias. Omitted variables could include the immigrant population, secularism and
religious attitudes, or cultural and social attitudes. The data for these variables is
more difficult to locate, but these omitted variables should be addressed for further
studies in this topic area.
An experiment would also be useful for finding more accurate results. With more
time and resources, a randomized controlled trial would help to show precisely the
effect that policy has on fertility rates. If we were able to randomly assign which
regions would receive social benefits for the family, which would not receive benefits,
and then measure the fertility rates accordingly, we would see the effects more
accurately. An experiment such as this, however, is unethical and highly implausible.
Therefore, we are forced to either use a natural experiment or use available nonrandom data to test the effect.
The sample size of the data could potentially be larger, but a size of ninety-six is
large enough for purposes of regressions, [-tests, and predictions.
Another potential problem is using the wrong function to perform the regression.
Because my dependent variable is continuous, I could compare the independent
variables to the fertility rate with scatter plots. From these plots, I discovered that
most of my variables were heteroskedastic. To fix this, I decided to run the regression
with robust standard errors to control for the heteroskedasticity. Then I tested each
variable to see if a log or quadratic function would improve its statistical significance.
However, none of the variables seemed to improve with the other functions. Since I
tested for the best forms for each of the variables, the biases that normally may have
been in my OLS regression were controlled for.
Factors that may skew my results are errors in the data I collected or in the actual
sample selection. Some of those measurements may have been incorrect or biased due
to an incorrect survey, nonrandom samples, or other issues that might have altered
my results. To control for this, I used the most reliable sources available. The World
Development Indicators (WDO database is well known for its accuracy, as well as
Eurostat. Both of these sources gave me the majority of my data and provided what
I believe to be accurate measurements, superseding any need for an instrument,
getting data from another source, or performing my own randomized experiment.

Conclusion
My findings show my hypothesis was correct. When time and state fixed effects
were included, the results were much more significant overall and, as shown by the
high R-squared values, explained more of the variance in fertility rates. Government
expenditures in the area of family contributions do show a significant impact on
fertility rates when tested alone and with other control variables. However, when also
controlling for time and state fixed effects, the results are more significant. This means
the results change over time and place and are much stronger indicators of the effect on
fertility rates. Since regression (4) was not significant overall (shown in Table 2), we can
rule out the assumption that the change in fertility rate is a product of time between the
years 1997-2007. There is, however, a significant difference across countries. This means
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differences by country are much stronger indicators of changes in fertility rates, further
proving that policy may be a large factor in that variance.
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